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This paper will argue for changes in the corporate structure of transit authorities in 
Ontario by contrasting their effectiveness in producing intermunicipal transit with British 
Columbia’s transit authorities. It is well established that transit is correlated to many benefits: 
socioeconomic opportunities, increased quality of life, boosting the local economy, and reducing 
the environmental impact of transportation. However, one area of neglect within Ontario has 
been the development of intermunicipal transit within Ontario outside of the Greater Toronto 
Area. British Columbia proves that with a centripetal authority structure (power towards the 
centre), transit organizations can be adaptive and cooperative. Ontario’s centrifugal authority 
structure (power away from the centre) is less adaptive, antagonistic, and can result in some 
transit authorities refusing to cooperate with others. While there are practical barriers to 
development, like determining who should pay for what, it is clear that the corporate structures 
from the local and provincial levels do not help negate these obstacles. The presence of these 
barriers then leads to the conclusion that Ontario has an inefficient corporate structure for 
overseeing the development of intermunicipal transit and should seek to reform it in some way 
to encourage cooperation or to consolidate under fewer transit authorities. Ultimately, this report 
will answer why the Province of Ontario and local transit authorities have been slow to develop 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper will argue for the reform of Ontario’s transit authorities to promote the 
development of more intermunicipal transit routes. This argument will be proven by contrasting 
Ontario’s transit system with British Columbia’s. In setting up this comparative case study, it is 
essential to note that intermunicipal transit shares a lot of the same benefits that people would 
experience with intramunicipal transit. These benefits include socioeconomic opportunities, 
increasing quality of life, environmental, and helping boost the local economy. All of these 
benefits can be applied to intermunicipal transit and should be pursued. In looking at British 
Columbia’s transit system, they have set themselves up to encourage a high degree of 
cooperation and have concentrated transit authority within two organizations for the entire 
province. This top-down approach has allowed these subsidiaries to develop transit routes 
without having to consider municipal boundaries. In contrast, Ontario’s transit system is 
organized around local transit authorities, and they face a lot of barriers to developing 
intermunicipal transit. Some of these barriers include geographically separated population 
densities outside of the Greater Toronto Area, restrictive bylaws, and corporate structures. For 
these reasons, Ontario has seen a lack of development in intermunicipal transit, which is why 
the province had to step in to create microtransit routes. Microtransit is Ontario’s name for 
intermunicipal transit with smaller busses. While there are some substantial barriers to 
development, British Columbia also faces similar geographical issues in terms of population 
centres being separated from one another outside of the Greater Vancouver Area. This paper 
aims to determine why Ontario has struggled to develop intermunicipal routes and what can 
change to make it easier to establish these routes in the future. In exploring the two transit 
systems, British Columbia proves itself to have a more efficient transit system through its 
 
5 
adaptiveness to Greyhound Bus route cancellations and its high level of cooperation throughout 
the province. Ontario demonstrates that it has a less efficient transit system through its slow 
response to the Greyhound Bus route cancellations, its mixed levels of cooperation, and also 
includes the case of London’s Transit Commission, where they refuse to develop routes into 
other municipalities. It becomes clear that the most significant barrier to developing more 
intermunicipal transit is the corporate structure currently being used in Ontario (at the provincial 
and local levels). Therefore, Ontario’s corporate structure is inefficient at promoting cooperation 
for intermunicipal transit, and that if Ontario wants more intermunicipal routes developed 
sustainably, then it needs to consider changing.  
I would also like to note that while a lot of the literature uses the term intercity to describe 
transit between two municipalities, I’ve chosen to utilize the word intermunicipal because it is 
more inclusive of what I am trying to explain. This is because there isn’t a consistent definition of 
how big a municipality needs to be before it can be classified as a city, and some of the 
municipalities connected to transit have less than 10,000 residents (which accounts for one 
definition of a city). 
 
CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND 
This chapter’s overarching goal is to provide a framework for understanding why 
intermunicipal transit is essential, the problems it faces, and the ideal way it can be developed 
further in Ontario. First, it will start by providing a brief overview as to why transit infrastructure is 
essential. Given that transit can help increase socioeconomic opportunities, the local economy, 
and help reduce greenhouse gasses, transit has become a necessary component of modern 
urban infrastructure. Second, to better understand the problems that Ontario faces, a case study 
of British Columbia’s transit infrastructure will be utilized to demonstrate how they manage their 
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transit system and how they can create intermunicipal transit. As British Columbia operates 
using a centripetal authority model for transit, it will provide a stark contrast for how transit can 
be managed. Third, this section will review Ontario’s transit infrastructure to provide a broad 
overview of how transit is managed within the province. As Ontario uses a centrifugal authority 
structure for managing transit, it will demonstrate some of the innate problems present when 
trying to develop intermunicipal transit through municipal partnerships. Fourth, building on some 
of the inherent issues discussed in the last section, this section will focus on the barriers present 
in Ontario for developing intermunicipal transit. Some of these problems could include a lack of 
population density, restrictive bylaws or policy, the avoidance of sprawl, and operational 
funding. These issues lead to the fifth section, where there will be a justification for the research. 
This section acknowledges the benefits of intermunicipal transit and the barriers preventing it in 
Ontario and makes a case for why this research approach is important. Sixth, this last section 
will look at the implication of this research and a theory of development for intermunicipal transit. 
Ultimately, this chapter will provide a framework for understanding the importance of 
intermunicipal transit, the corporate structure of transit in British Columbia and Ontario, 
articulate the barriers to development, and provide a rationale for further pursuing this research.  
 
2.1 Importance of Transit  
Transit is a vital component of modern urban infrastructure, and there are many 
compelling reasons why so many municipalities pursue it. First, public transit can help reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and improve air quality. Being environmentally friendly is perhaps 
obvious, but it is important to reiterate and see how many passengers are required to justify 
transit. Second, public transit increases the quality of life. Having access to this kind of 
infrastructure can have a significant impact on the lives of those who do not drive, but also helps 
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increase economic activity for the community as a whole. These first two reasons justify the 
need for intramunicipal transit. However, given how this paper looks explicitly at intermunicipal 
transit, the remaining reasons help justify crossing municipal boundaries. Third, as real estate 
prices in cities become more expensive, more people are required to commute from further 
distances to get to work, and roads are becoming more congested. Without transit to go from 
where people live to where they work, the problem alienates those who do not drive and only 
makes commuting worse. In larger cities, some affordable living spaces may be connected 
within the same municipality. Still, it is more likely that more people will have to commute from 
out of town to work, which might not be possible without transit. Which leads to reason four, 
even if someone only needed to leave town for the day for a medical appointment or to visit a 
loved one in the hospital, transit is the most affordable way to get there. This is especially 
important if core services are not being offered in their community. Therefore, transit is an 
essential component of modern infrastructure within urban centres, commuter sheds, and 
regional social service delivery networks. 
It is a well-known fact that public transportation is an easy way for a community to emit 
fewer greenhouse gasses (GHG). Heavy-duty busses typically become more efficient than 
personal motor vehicles (PMV) per person when there are more than 11 passengers on board 
(Jaffe, 2012). Of course, that changes based on the type of vehicles used. Still, it does validate 
the fundamental premise that public transit systems, in general, are better for the environment 
provided that people use it. Other agencies have also confirmed this notion and have gone on to 
say that some modern buses only need seven passengers to be more efficient than PMV’s 
(DNREC, 2019). This comparison changes based on the make and model of vehicles being 
compared. While this is an important consideration, the second reason shows the benefits that 
transit can have on a specific community.  
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The second reason why intermunicipal public transit is necessary is that it increases the 
quality of life. Increasing quality of life includes the increased mobility that teenagers, seniors, 
low-income, and those unable to drive experience but also gives these groups access to 
potential jobs and health care services at a low price. It also includes the strong positive 
correlation public transportation has with economic benefits for the broader community (Bhatta, 
2003). These benefits could include rising housing prices, increased economic activity, or 
employment rates. Public transportation provides a benefit not only to those who require it for 
their daily commute but also helps those in the community who do not even use it. For instance, 
transit helps increase the labour pool available to employers and increase the number of people 
who can attend tourism events and contribute to the economic development of a municipality. 
According to one Harvard University study, public transportation has been identified as the 
number one way to escape poverty and climb the social mobility ladder (Bouchard, 2015). 
Therefore, whether or not an individual uses transit personally, it is still a worthwhile pursuit 
given the significant number of benefits it provides for the overall community.  
Third, there is a trend in Canada that people are moving away from city centres and 
opting to commute for work. The 2016 Census shows that people will spend 26.2 minutes 
commuting to work (Statistics Canada - 1, 2016). Commuting further for work makes sense for 
people since property values have increased exponentially in city centres like Toronto over the 
past five years, while other places like Ottawa have increased at more reasonable rates (RBC 
Research, 2017). Some of the places in Ontario with higher housing costs also include cottage 
areas. These recreational properties have been increasing at 7.2 percent year over year (Royal 
Lepage, 2019). This lack of affordability ultimately means that more and more people become 
part of the working poor as they can no longer afford to live close to their work. As a report from 
Generation Squeeze​ argues, the average Ontario housing prices would need to drop by over 
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half for 25 - 34-year-olds to afford a mortgage of 80% of the value (Kershaw, 2019, p.13). These 
growing trends have effectively put large portions of the population who work lower-income jobs 
in desperate need of public transportation between municipalities to access more job 
opportunities. In addition to housing costs, public transit also reduces the number of cars on the 
road, meaning that there is less gridlock and more space available for parks (National Express 
Transit, 2018).  
Finally, public transit is the most affordable way to travel. Aside from a volunteer 
organization helping people get to their medical appointments, intermunicipal transit is the 
cheapest way to get to the amenities that people need. Affordable intermunicipal services are 
particularly important for places that do not have all the amenities that are available in a larger 
city. This has become increasingly relevant since Greyhound Bus cut the majority of its routes 
back in 2018 (Greyhound Bus, 2018). Service reductions limit the distance people can go 
without a car, and it is a gap that could be filled through intermunicipal transit services. Even 
though it might take longer, people are willing to take transit for their budget. 
Transit is a positive force at work within municipalities. They provide a more 
environmentally friendly alternative to personal motor vehicles, they increase economic activity, 
all while helping those who face financial pressures to commute to work. Therefore, 
intermunicipal transit is a worthwhile endeavour and can dramatically improve the lives of those 
who live in and around urban centres.  
 
2.2 Overview of BC Transit 
British Columbia’s transit infrastructure demonstrates a stark contrast to how transit 
infrastructure has been managed in Ontario. Reviewing British Columbia’s transit model will be 
done in three parts. The first section will cover the governing legislation, how it interacts with 
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other government entities, and how it carries out operations. Unlike Ontario, British Columbia’s 
transit infrastructure is managed entirely through a shared service model, by utilizing a crown 
corporation and a transit authority which controls all transit operations within the province. The 
second section will review some of the benefits that BC Transit’s centralized governance model 
has to offer over centrifugal transit systems. A centralized model of governance provides a lot of 
benefits, including the ability to operate intermunicipally with ease, operate with efficiencies of 
scale, and utilize the crown corporation’s professional experience when establishing new routes. 
In the final section, there will be a review of some of the drawbacks that can occur in BC’s 
transit model and how they have handled these types of issues. One specific example is how 
Victoria felt like they did not have enough local authority over their transit system, and it resulted 
in lobbying the province to change the regional transit commission. While there are some 
drawbacks to British Columbia’s transit system, it is clear that overall it provides many benefits 
and has made it a more connected place to live. 
In looking at the corporate structure and governance of British Columbia’s transit 
authority, it is clear that they have taken a centralized approach to managing this infrastructure. 
All of the transit within the province is overseen by two governmental agencies BC Transit and 
the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority. BC Transit is a provincial crown 
corporation whose mandate is to,  
 
“to plan, acquire, construct or cause to be constructed public passenger transportation systems 
and rail transit systems that support regional growth strategies, official community plans and the 




BC Transit has existed as a crown corporation fulfilling this role of planning and providing transit 
for the province since 1979 (BC Transit - 1, 2020). BC Transit was the only approval authority in 
the province for public transportation systems in the province until 1998 when the South Coast 
British Columbia Transportation Authority (also known as TransLink or SCBCTA) was legislated 
into existence (SCBCTA Act, 1998). It is important to note that TransLink is not a crown 
corporation but is a statutory authority solely operating within Metro Vancouver; however, it is 
still responsible for managing and operating a regional transportation network (SCBCTA Act, 
1998, 4(1)a). Both BC Transit and the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority 
are given the power to raise funds through taxation (with the support of transit commissions), 
receive provincial grants to fund operations, and develop transit plans in line with regional and 
community strategic plans (SCBCTA Act, 1998, 4(1) and BC Transit Act, 1996, 8(1)). In carrying 
out their operations, BC Transit operates some of the busses themselves; however, many 
operational duties are assigned to regional authorities, municipalities, or is completed through 
shared service agreements (BC Transit - 2, 2017). On the other hand, TransLink is responsible 
for buses, the SeaBus, the West Coast Express, and the SkyTrain. Plus, they also oversee the 
major bridges and highway corridors within Metro Vancouver. To manage all this infrastructure, 
TransLink has created subsidiaries to help them oversee specific aspects of their network. This 
includes the Coast Mountain Bus Company to oversee busses and the SeaBus, BC Rapid 
Transit Co. to oversee the SkyTrain, and TransLink directly oversees the construction and 
maintenance of major bridges and highway corridors (TransLink Corporate Overview, 2020). BC 
Transit is essentially a province-wide shared service model and boasts about being able to 
create efficiencies that one municipal transit authority simply could not do alone. Likewise, 
Translink is able to provide an extensive transit network in the Greater Vancouver Area.  
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There are several benefits that a centralized transit model can offer over a centrifugal 
model, like operating with efficiencies of scale and not being constrained by municipal or 
regional boundaries. For instance, BC Transit saves about twenty percent on the cost of fuel 
and eight percent on busses because they are buying in such large quantities (BC Transit - 2, 
2017). These cost savings are then passed along to the consumers in the form of cheaper 
passes. As of June 2020, a monthly pass for BC Transit changes based on location, but it can 
range from $55 in Campbell River to $85 in the Capital Regional District (BC Transit - 3, 2020). 
A pass in similar sized cities is $86 in North Bay, ON, and $95 in London, ON (City of North Bay 
- 1 and London Transit Commission - 1, 2020). Of course, fare collection is not an accurate 
reflection of the total cost because it only helps recover costs but can encourage more riders to 
consider using transit over personal motor vehicles. Based on 2015 numbers, the Canadian 
Urban Transit Association rates BC Transit as having about fifteen percent more passengers 
per hour and operates about twenty percent more efficiently than cities of similar sizes (CUTA 
Factbook, 2015). In addition to these considerable cost savings, the province can become more 
connected because BC Transit largely does not need to worry about municipal or regional 
boundaries. BC Transit has the authority to traverse these boundaries to establish 
intermunicipal transit routes to allow for greater mobility to those who would otherwise be 
unable. This ability to traverse boundaries became important when Greyhound dramatically 
reduced its services in 2018 (Greyhound Bus, 2018). BC Transit was able to start planning 
replacement routes immediately and was able to launch BC Bus North and offer trips within a 
few days after Greyhound’s last trip (Nielsen, 2018). Combining large-scale operational 
efficiencies with their province-wide authority allows BC Transit to rapidly adapt to new 
situations and provide a cost-effective transit service for BC residents. Finally, having a 
centralized model allows the province to set up a relatively stable operating budget for regions 
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or municipalities that allows costs to be somewhat predictable. As a general rule, local 
governments will account for 23.6% of the budget, the province accounts for 46.4% of funding, 
and operational revenues account for 25.5% of the total budget (BC Transit - 2, 2017). This 
funding model is by no means fixed, but it helps provide perspective about how operations are 
typically financed. Ultimately, the centralized model used by BC Transit has been extremely 
effective in reducing costs for municipalities and providing guidance for future transit plans. 
There are benefits to a centralized transit system; however, some communities have felt that 
their concerns are not being met or addressed by these unknown professionals. 
One of the major drawbacks of having a centralized authority is that local autonomy 
seems to go by the wayside. People who live in a community know the problems and desires of 
residents better and can arguably plan transit routes to match what the community wants. This 
sort of problem came to the fore in the Capital Regional District in 2011 when the elected board 
wrote an open letter to the minister responsible for transit to ask for more democratic changes 
(CRD, 2011). Essentially, the Victoria Regional Transit Committee (VRTC) was responsible for 
recommending transit routes, fare cost, property tax rates, and policy direction, but was all being 
done without elected officials being involved (CRD, 2011). The VRTC and BC Transit were not 
communicating their plans or budgets with municipalities and did not allow for input from the 
CRD board when creating those plans. This situation resulted in an undemocratic system that 
did not allow the CRD to properly plan city spaces for their mixed-use transportation network 
and resulted in taxation without representation (CRD, 2011). The minister announced changes 
to allow elected officials on the VRTC board in 2012, and ever since, the board has been 
comprised of members of the CRD board along with a few non-elected appointments. While the 
CRD board has representation from every municipality in the region, the VRTC does not. The 
seats for the VRTC board are designated based on population, and some places have to rotate 
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a seat between mayors resulting in several places still not having representation on the board 
(BC Transit Act, 1996, 25(7)). For instance, the mayor of View Royal has yet to hold a seat on 
the board and has been very public about not getting an increase in transit services for his 
municipality (Oli, 2019). The goal of the change to the VRTC is not to ensure democratic 
transparency, but to “ensure that key transportation decisions and/or investments do not 
compromise the regional network with unintended consequences” (CRD, 2011, p.2). It seems 
that the province only agreed to give this authority to members of the CRD board because they 
have a more complex system and adequate resources to integrate their master plan with their 
transit plan properly.  
While there are imperfections with the system, it is clear that the benefits of cooperation 
still outweigh the costs of working alone. BC Transit saves a considerable amount on costs with 
the scale of efficiency and can traverse municipal or regional boundaries with ease. The 
centralized governance model has allowed the province to provide transit in 130 communities 
and to adapt quickly when unexpected situations arise, like the decline of Greyhound Bus. As 
there are many benefits, it is only natural that some drawbacks occur, and this came in the form 
of a decline in local autonomy. Ultimately, this decline to local autonomy was fought against in 
the Capital Regional District, where transit and the mixed-use transportation network became a 
priority for elected officials and required greater public control over this infrastructure. The 
province responded accordingly by allowing members of the CRD board to sit on the Victoria 
Regional Transit Commission.  
 
2.3 Overview of Transit in Ontario 
Ontario’s transit infrastructure operates in a very different way than British Columbia and 
represents a model that focuses on local autonomy. Covering Ontario’s transit infrastructure will 
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be done in three parts. The first part will review the corporate structure and governing legislation 
for transit. This will include an overview of how the majority of the province is governed in the 
Municipal Act, 2001, and how the Greater Golden Horseshoe oversees its transit infrastructure. 
Second, this paper will look at the new development of microtransit routes being established in 
Ontario and how they contribute to the goal of having intermunicipal transit. Finally, this section 
will point out some of the problems that arise due to the centrifugal authority structure. 
Ultimately this section will show how Ontario governs its transit infrastructure and why it is 
problematic for future intermunicipal plans.  
Ontario’s municipalities are given broad authority under the Province of Ontario to be 
able to plan and operate their transit network however they see fit. The Ontario Municipal Act, 
2001, gives municipalities the exclusive right to create a public transportation system within their 
municipal boundary (s.69(2)a). This legislation means that every municipality is responsible for 
creating its network and is under no obligation to work with any other municipality. This 
governance model leads to a centrifugal network of transit authorities, each trying to accomplish 
their own goals without working towards a larger provincial plan. Throughout the province, 115 
municipalities operate a transit system that ranges from specialized services to traditional transit 
infrastructure (Ministry of Transportation, 2020). A specialized service might include 
door-to-door pick-up or services for a specific group of people like handicap or seniors. A 
traditional system is one where buses operate on pre-planned routes. There are only two times 
a municipality is forced to work with another sub-provincial authority. The first is when a 
lower-tier municipality has to coordinate with an upper-tier municipality (s.69(3)). The second is 
in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), where the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority (GTTA) 
has the responsibility of creating and executing a regional transportation plan for the entire 
Greater Toronto and Hamilton region (Metrolinx, 2020). The GTTA is the primary authority within 
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the GTA. It exists “to provide leadership in the co-ordination, planning, financing and 
development of an integrated, multi-modal transportation network” (GTTA Act, 2006, s.5(1)a). 
This authority gives the GTTA broad authority to design and plan an integrated transportation 
network with the GTA, including GO Transit and major highways (GTTA, 2006, s.6(1)). It is 
worth noting that GO Transit is a crown corporation controlled by the GTTA and that the GTTA 
is commonly referred to as ‘Metrolinx’ (Metrolinx, 2020). The GO Transit network has also been 
expanding outside of the GTA and reaching more of the Greater Golden Horseshoe region with 
light rail trains operating from Barrie, Niagara Falls, Oshawa, and Waterloo to central Toronto 
(GO Transit, 2020). By creating a regional entity, the Greater Golden Horseshoe region enjoys a 
comprehensive intermunicipal transit network while the remainder of the province has minimal 
connectivity outside of their municipality.  
Given the infrequency of intermunicipal transit options outside of the GTA network, the 
Ontario Public Transit Association has been actively promoting more transit systems. In 2015, 
there were 95 transit systems in Ontario. In 2019 that number grew to 109 (Peters, 2019). 
These numbers are beginning to get boosted through microtransit routes that use smaller buses 
for intermunicipal transit. The province was launching four of these routes in the Spring of 2020, 
which is now being delayed due to COVID-19 (CBC News, 2020). These microtransit routes are 
exactly the kind of transit systems that Ontario needs to build intermunicipal ridership. 
Microtransit is essentially a smaller bus transit service with limited routes and stops designed to 
help people commute from one municipality to another. There are four routes, including a 
Tillsonburg-Ingersoll-Dorchester-London route, an Owen Sounds-Wiarton-Blue 
Mountain-Orangeville route, a Sarnia-Strathroy-London route, and a Dorchester-London route. 
Currently, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation is offering to pay for all operating costs for the 
first five years (Strathroy-Caradoc, 2020). However, it is unclear as to who will be responsible 
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for the route after that. As public transit is often subsidized and not paid entirely by the province, 
it is unclear whether or not the province will try to download the service to the municipalities 
benefiting from it once ridership has been built.  
This last section will look at some of the problems that arise from having a centrifugal 
authority structure in municipal transit. While the current system seems to work just fine when 
municipalities only want to provide transit within their municipality, it has proven to be quite 
difficult to work with other municipalities to extend services. The biggest issue comes down to 
who will pay for ongoing operational costs. While there is no intention of looking at the ongoing 
costs of transit infrastructure as part of this research question, it is clear that deciding who will 
pay continues to be a huge hurdle preventing the creation of more intermunicipal routes. For 
example, if a city extends one of their transit lines to link up with a nearby municipality, should 
the newly connected municipality have to pay for fifty percent of the extension or nothing 
because it benefits the first city more? It gets less complicated when municipalities are forced to 
work under a regional entity like an upper-tier municipality. However, even when they cross over 
into another upper or single-tier municipality, the same questions are raised. Again the 
questions of ongoing costs are raised when looking at the future of microtransit. The province is 
currently paying one hundred percent of the costs, but it is extremely unclear what will happen 
at the end of the five years. If the government renews the funding, then it will still be paying for 
all of the costs. Without creating regional authorities, how will the province be able to download 
microtransit services back down to municipalities when they are not structurally set up to divide 
costs? Certainly, all municipalities involved could agree to pay their fair share, but it is extremely 
unclear as to what is fair. For instance, the Sarnia-Strathroy-London route was a project 
undertaken by Strathroy that Sarnia also supported. The London Transit Commission also 
supported the project by helping plan the route and getting provincial approval. However, the 
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London Transit Commission made it clear that they wanted no part in it if they would have to 
pay for the ongoing operational costs. This is partly because the microtransit route would not 
help the residents of London nearly as much as it would help the people in Strathroy and 
Sarnia. The province could certainly force the London Transit Commission to pay for part of the 
costs, but this would not be popular in London. Short of forcing every municipality to pay for part 
of the cost of intermunicipal transit, it is unlikely the government will be able to download costs 
to municipalities without forcing it to happen through legislation. Here is an opportunity for the 
government to critically look at how it structures transit operations to see if the centrifugal 
structure is the best option for promoting collaboration and cooperation. 
Ontario’s centrifugal network of transit authorities has seemed to work well for the 
development of its current transit infrastructure. Municipalities can control how and when 
services are expanded throughout their municipality, and they can make quick decisions that 
adapt to the needs of the community. One downside of this established system is how it 
prevents municipalities from working together to create intermunicipal transit routes. Trying to 
figure out who should pay for new routes seems to be one of the biggest barriers to new route 
creation.  
 
2.4 Barriers to Development 
While the corporate structure of public transportation authority is certainly one of the 
biggest barriers to intermunicipal transit development, it is certainly not the only problem 
present. In Ontario, there are many systemic barriers in place preventing the further 
development of intermunicipal transit. Problems stem from the fact that some municipalities 
refuse to operate outside their municipal boundary and have put bylaws in place to prevent it. 
While laws can change, it certainly sets the tone for how they feel about intermunicipal 
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collaboration. Additionally, there is a lack of population density present in the province to be 
able to justify most forms of public transportation according to the Ontario Transit Supportive 
Guidelines. This means that outside of the Greater Golden Horseshoe, light rail transit is not 
feasible, and it is difficult to find routes that would support traditional bus transit. Finally, this 
section will look at how changing the funding model for transit has negatively affected the 
development of plans.  
Some of the largest gaps in transit in Ontario seems to stem from the lack of cooperation 
between municipalities outside of the GTA to create intermunicipal transit routes. Given the 
deficit of routes available, there is a strong case to ignore municipal boundaries to provide this 
kind of service. Perhaps the biggest gap in Ontario’s transit is the lack of cooperation to connect 
commuter sheds to urban centres outside of the GTA. This lack of cooperation is fueled by the 
policy restrictions of places like London, where the London Transit Commission is prohibited 
from operating outside the municipal boundary (London By-law A.-6377-206, 2016). It seems 
unlikely for municipalities like London to work towards intermunicipal transit unless transit starts 
operating from a regional or provincial level to offer services that are best for the entire region, 
not just for one municipality. If people’s driving behaviours do not reflect municipal boundaries, 
then it only seems natural to ignore these invisible boundaries, even if it means restructuring 
transit to be run from a regional entity to force cooperation instead of a local commission.  
Looking at examples of intermunicipal transit internationally, it is perhaps easy to point to 
the European model and wish that we had a similar system in place in Ontario. The Eurail 
allows travellers to venture across 33 countries and make use of their 40,000 destinations 
(Eurail, 2020). It also accounts for a total population of 548,370,287 and approximately 
4,988,775 km2 from all of these countries (WorldOMeter, 2020). In addition to this vast network, 
individual countries supplement the rail network with a bus transit network to ensure all key 
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areas of their country are connected. Ideally, Ontario would strive to have a network as vast and 
efficient as Europe to experience the benefits outlined previously. However, despite any desire 
Ontarians might have towards building such a system, there are many pragmatic reasons why 
these efforts always seem to fall short of expectations. The most significant reason that 
prevents Ontario from creating a comprehensive transit network is the low population density. 
Low population density is an issue because it means fewer people can pay for the upfront 
infrastructure costs and use the transit system when built. In Europe, they have an average 
population density of 110 people per km2. In Ontario, we have 908,699.33 km2 of land, with a 
population of only 13.4 million residents creating a land density of only 14.8 people per km2 
(Statistics Canada - 2, 2016). This lack of overall density within Ontario creates the largest 
practical problem in creating a vast intermunicipal network. Ontario’s geography simply has a lot 
of low population areas throughout the province, and it makes it nearly impossible to create a 
viable transit network to connect it all. It would be completely impractical to develop a 
comprehensive passenger rail network due to the costs. To remain cost-effective, a light rail 
transit network would need a population density of 3,458 people per km2 around each station 
(Guerra, 2012, p.6). This is unlikely to happen throughout most of Ontario. However, Toronto 
does surpass this threshold with an average population density of 4,334.4 people per km2 
(Statistics Canada - 2, 2016). This is why the GTA can support the Toronto Transit Commission, 
which is owned by the City of Toronto (City of Toronto, 2020), as well as Go Transit, a provincial 
corporation operated by Metrolinx (Metrolinx, 2020). Outside of the Golden Horseshoe, Ontario 
is nowhere close to the required amount of density required to support light rail. This is why 
Metrolinx can run a cost-effective light rail system throughout the GTA region and not one that 
spans the entire province. The Go Transit system is a good example of a transit system in 
Ontario that captures the surrounding area of commuters travelling into the city for work. The Go 
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Transit system stretches from Barrie to Niagara Falls and from Waterloo to Peterborough (Go 
Transit, 2020). Alternatively, other cities in Ontario, such as London or North Bay, do not extend 
beyond municipal boundaries and fails to capture commuter traffic coming into their cities 
(London Transit - 2, 2020 and City of North Bay - 2, 2020). Intermunicipal transit remains a huge 
problem due to the lack of population density, and Ontario’s guidelines do not recommend 
building transit infrastructure unless density thresholds are met. 
The province often looks at density not just in terms of population when determining a 
new possible route, but also the number of jobs in the desired area (Ontario Ministry of 
Transportation (MTO), 2012, p.24). For instance, the province recommends a minimum of 50 
residents and jobs combined per hectare to justify a basic bus transportation route (MTO, p.24). 
For a dedicated rapid transit service, they recommend a job/population density of 160 per 
hectare (p.24) with subway and light rail requiring more density than that. According to the 
University of Toronto’s Centre for Urban and Community Studies,  
 
“Very few [Census Tract’s] outside Toronto exceed the threshold of 80 people/ha. The most 
common population density in municipalities outside Toronto is 20 to 40 people/ha, with 
significant areas between 10 and 20 people/ha. Only a few recently developed suburban areas, 
such as southern Markham, have more than 40 people/ha” (p.21). 
 
Low densities mean that for most parts of the province, a rail network would be inappropriate for 
a cost-effective system; however, a better bus transit network could be plausible by overcoming 
some barriers. The province also asks municipalities to think of transit as a partner in city 
planning and use it to encourage the infill of high-density areas before providing services to new 
areas (MTO, p. 3). Following these rules means that before a municipality like London should 
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develop a route outside its boundaries, it should ensure that its available land is developed first 
to allow for cheaper service delivery (p. 11). The province is encouraging municipalities to avoid 
urban sprawl so that utilities and services can remain cost-effective. This idea of building up 
density first also contributes to the same kind of goals that transit offers because keeping things 
close together is more environmentally friendly, helps people access jobs, and can provide 
more services to more people. Ensuring that intermunicipal transit does not contribute to sprawl 
is an issue that needs to be taken seriously. Additionally, this idea of avoiding sprawl is further 
reinforced when the province says that transit networks should be self-containing and have all 
required amenities and goods available through the network, so there is less of a need to drive 
(p.13). This would mean that intramunicipal transit should be prioritized, and intermunicipal 
transit is secondary. While the transit guidelines recommend pursuing intermunicipal transit, it 
only says to “work with regional and municipal authorities to develop inter-urban transit” with no 
other support or advice in the document for doing so (p.13). The growing struggle to create and 
retain intermunicipal transit throughout the province reveals an opportunity for better 
development.  
Another ongoing issue for public transportation is the changing funding structure within 
the Ontario Gas Tax. The Ontario Gas Tax has been a steadily growing source of income to 
help fund the operations of public transportation systems (AMO Report, 2019, p.5). As the 
Ontario Liberals were in power for 15 years, they created a very steady and reliable funding 
structure, but since the 2018 election with the Progressive Conservatives taking power, funding 
has been entirely restructured and reduced (AMO Report, 2019, p.5 - 6). This dramatic shift in 
funding has ruined transit development plans and brought about a lot of uncertainty for future 
plans. One municipality’s plans that have been interrupted is Kawartha Lakes. Kawartha Lakes 
has had a long term vision of connecting its transit system with a Go Transit bus stop so that its 
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residents could access the entire GTA region (Kawartha Lakes, 2018). This 2018 plan indicates 
that this would have happened in 2026 (Kawartha Lakes, 2018), but now that the funding model 
has changed, a new plan will need to be created, and this plan will likely get postponed. While 
this problem cannot be addressed or solved within this paper’s scope, it is important to note how 
difficult it is for transit authorities to create long-term plans when funding structures continue to 
change.  
Finally, there is also the notable decline of Ontario Northlander and Greyhound Bus 
service. These two corporations provided a lot of support for intermunicipal transit. However, 
they both experienced ridership decline before reducing routes. Ontario Northlander is a 
provincial crown corporation that provided passenger rail services to Northern Ontario until 2012 
(Horrobin, 2019). The population density of Northern Ontario could not support train 
infrastructure and would have required significant subsidization. Greyhound Bus is a for-profit 
intermunicipal bus service that scaled back the majority of its rural and northern routes in 2018 
(Northern Ontario Business, 2018). As Greyhound Bus is a for-profit corporation, it does not 
receive government funding. If an intermunicipal transit system is to succeed where these two 
organizations failed, it would need to be non-profit, subsidized, and appropriate for the 
population density. The idea of creating a small bus service to rural areas to begin building 
ridership to switch to larger buses later would be the appropriate approach, which is what 
Ontario is currently pursuing with microtransit throughout the province. 
It is undeniable that there are many problems to overcome when developing 
intermunicipal transit. A few of the hardships include corporations reducing their routes, policy 
restrictions, a lack of density throughout the province, and the lack of consistency in the funding 
model. Some things simply cannot be changed easily, like population density; however, knowing 
the limits to what a cost-effective route can handle is vital so that service gaps can be found. 
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While there is some hope that microtransit will help lead to a revitalization of intermunicipal 
transit throughout the province, there is still no corporate structure in place that adequately 
supports collaboration and cooperation between transit authorities. 
 
2.5 Justification for Research 
One of the goals of this research is to diagnose the reasons for the lack of intermunicipal public 
transit being developed outside of the Greater Golden Horseshoe. Currently, to travel between 
municipalities without the use of a personal motor vehicle, people could use trains (like Via 
Rail), airplanes, or for-profit bus companies. These options are not ideal for everyday travel 
because they are generally far more expensive than taking a personal motor vehicle. Airplanes 
also are not ideal due to their increased environmental footprint. Intermunicipal bus transit will 
seek to reduce carbon emissions and costs for consumers and help increase the mobility of 
teenagers, seniors, low-income persons, and those unable to drive. This is a particularly timely 
research question to be looking at because Ontario is just starting their microtransit routes, and 
it is being paid entirely by the province. After the trial phase is over, it is unclear who will 
continue paying for these services. Typically, the municipalities benefiting from transit would 
contribute to the overall cost, but it is increasingly complicated to say what is fair and who 
should pay for it. This complicated funding arrangement is why a case study looking at how 
another Canadian province handles intermunicipal transit would help this situation. British 
Columbia is a good case study because it has a corporate structure that allows them to make 
changes easily, and they have proven they can set up intermunicipal routes quickly and 
efficiently. Finally, while this paper could have focused on the intermunicipal routes that one 
municipality could have established, it would still face several practical barriers that would likely 
lead to the project failing. However, by addressing the problems with how Ontario has set up 
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their transit system, some adjustments made from the provincial level could make it a lot easier 
for establishing intermunicipal routes across the province. Ultimately, an extensive exploration 
into this research question will identify the primary barriers holding Ontario back and offer some 
suggestions for what it can do to help create more intermunicipal transit routes. 
 
2.6 Implications and Theory 
This section will explore the theory for how an intermunicipal transit service should be 
developed and give a hypothesis as to why they are not currently happening. First, High-Speed 
Bus Transit (HSBT) is a transit system developed by researchers out of Arizona, which looks at 
the viability of public buses travelling from one urban area to another (Ranjbari et al., 2017). In 
it, they call for intermunicipal transit to fill the gap in passenger transportation. In applying their 
theory, we can see many similarities between it and the LINX transit system in the County of 
Simcoe. The LINX transit system runs from each end of the county to connect to the Go Transit 
station in Barrie. This kind of interconnectedness is precisely the kind of infrastructure that can 
significantly increase the socioeconomic conditions available to those who do not drive. Finally, I 
hypothesize that intermunicipal transit development is rare in Ontario because the corporate 
structure of local transit authorities is not conducive for regional cooperation. Municipalities are 
not forced to work together and have little incentive to do so.  
The general theory for why intermunicipal transit is good is because it increases the 
quality of life, reduces greenhouse gases, and helps increase economic activity within a 
community. To accomplish these goals, American transit researchers developed a theory 
arguing for a new method of intermunicipal transit that they call ‘high-speed bus transit’ (HSBT), 
in which buses would have a dedicated lane on the freeway with high cruising speeds (Ranjbari 
et al., 2017). HSBT was a research study from Arizona, so the survey results’ applicability is 
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questionable, but the general idea that people would take a transit system that meets their 
needs seems valid anywhere in North America. Ultimately, the research agreed that there is a 
gap in transit infrastructure, that HSBT is a viable option for filling that gap, and that there is a 
general openness to this new system. When applying this general model to Ontario, it should be 
clear that this is not designed to be a replacement for long haul passenger bus services, but an 
extension of transit services for commuter sheds. While this specific model of transit called for a 
dedicated bus lane on highways, it would not be necessary or practical when used for smaller 
communities. Also, it is important to note that this is a high-speed system so stops would be 
limited. An intermunicipal service could have a stop every couple of kilometres, however, this 
would incentivize the urban sprawl that the Ministry of Transportation tries to avoid (MTO, 2012, 
p. 3, 11) and make the service so slow that people would not want to take it. Avoiding 
unnecessary stops will help alleviate the concern that an intermunicipal transit service might 
work against proper urban planning. In practice, it is clear that the new microtransit routes being 
established by the province mostly meet the criteria as HSBT, with the only notable difference 
being the size of the bus being used. 
An excellent example of an intermunicipal transit system at work with limited stops in the 
County of Simcoe’s LINX transit network. The County of Simcoe’s transit plan has already 
created an intermunicipal transit infrastructure that connects Barrie, Collingwood, 
Penetanguishene, and Wasaga Beach. When Simcoe County did a needs assessment on their 
transit needs, they found that 28 percent of trips ended in different municipalities within the 
county (Steer, 2015, p.25). Another 15.2 percent of trips had a destination in Barrie or Orilla 
(Steer, 2015, p.25). While the demand to travel outside of the county was significantly less, it 
still represented a significant number of transit users. This assessment presented an opportunity 
to connect Simcoe County’s transit to the GO Transit network for the Greater Toronto Area. Now 
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that the system is in place, transit users can travel as far as they want on the system for $6.00 
or less (County of Simcoe - 1, 2019). Of course, there is a requirement to pay an additional fare 
when switching to the GO Transit system. This combined network is a great deal for passengers 
as no other method of transportation is as cheap. Even driving a personal vehicle is likely to 
cost more in gas than taking this transit system.  
Finally, I would also like to note that my ongoing hypothesis is that the structural 
governance of transit networks is the biggest hurdle in creating intermunicipal transit systems. 
This hypothesis cannot be proved directly since there are not always public notes or information 
about failed talks between municipalities to establish intermunicipal transit routes. Instead, this 
hypothesis can be proved through the ​Evidence of Absence​. The evidence of absence is a 
logical argument where the absence of something could point to a truth about the situation 
(Thompson, 2018). For example, Arthur Doyle uses this in a Sherlock Holmes book, ​The Silver 
Blaze​.​ ​In the book, Sherlock notices that a dog typically barks when a stranger walks by, but the 
dog did not bark the night its owner was killed. This fact leads Sherlock to infer that the killer 
likely knew the victim. The absence of the dog barking is very telling (Doyle, 1892). Likewise, by 
comparing two provinces with considerable resources but using different structures for 
controlling transit, if one province has far less intermunicipal transit routes, then corporate 
structure could be the problem. Therefore, the underlying methodology for research will involve 
comparing Ontario’s transit infrastructure to British Columbia’s to see if corporate structure 
might be impacting the types of transit being developed. 
With the framework of the HSBT, there is a case to be made for direct intermunicipal bus 
transit. This kind of investment in transit infrastructure will provide timely transportation and a 
convenient way to access public resources. The County of Simcoe has already demonstrated its 
willingness to make this kind of investment by connecting their transit service to Barrie. 
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However, despite knowing the benefits of transit infrastructure, intermunicipal routes are rare 
within the province. This paper also speculates that local transit authorities’ structure is a 
significant barrier to the development of intermunicipal routes and will lay out the methodology 
for proving this in the next chapter.  
 
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Research Methodology 
In this section, the overarching goal is to provide a framework for the research that will 
be done and how it will be analyzed. Starting with Sandra Van Thiel’s book, ​Research Methods 
in Public Administration and Public Management​, she outlines the inductive research process 
for how one can go from a problem to developing a theory about it (Van Thiel, 2014, p.25). This 
research process involves going through different stages, such as problem, observation, 
inductive research, axiom, and theory (p.25). After understanding the general framework for 
inductive research, the process for investigating the case study and the original case will be 
explained. This process will include using objective questions to understand which system has 
been more successful at creating intermunicipal routes. Finally, this section will conclude with 
how the research will be analyzed so that it can be used to reach a conclusion.  
First, Van Thiel outlines the inductive research process in her book and it starts with the 
problem stage (p.25). In this paper’s case, the problem is the lack of intermunicipal transit 
available in Ontario outside of the GTA. This problem is more significant for people who do not 
or cannot drive and miss out on the benefits that transit could provide. Second, based on 
observations, some parts of the province like the County of Simcoe are doing an excellent job of 
connecting their region. However, the lack of connectivity is challenging to fix across the 
province. While some potential areas could use further development, a lot of the province does 
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not have enough population density to support transit. Both the problem and observations have 
already been described in the last chapter. Third, using inductive research will involve using 
knowing data about BC Transit and Ontario’s transit infrastructure to create a narrative about 
how each of their corporate structures affects intermunicipal route creation. Creating a narrative 
will rely on hard data as well as anecdotal evidence. This narrative will then lead to the fourth 
stage of the research, where an axiom or theorem can be created based on the research 
results. Ideally, this will lead to conclusions about what can be done in Ontario to help 
encourage the creation of more intermunicipal transit routes.  
In carrying out the research, the goal is to compare the differences between BC Transit 
and Ontario’s transit networks to demonstrate the similarities, differences, and adaptiveness. 
One approach to gain this specific information is to ask objective questions about both transit 
systems to see how both could respond. For instance, how did both transit systems respond 
when Greyhound Bus cancelled the majority of their routes? Their responses will help 
demonstrate the adaptiveness of the two organizations. Additionally, this research will use 
anecdotal evidence to conclude why intermunicipal transit has not been successful in Ontario. 
One example is the case of London, Ontario, and why they failed to develop a transit route to 
Dorchester. This case is one of the municipalities that is receiving a microtransit route. However, 
if London cared about the direction of provincial policy and made an effort to collaborate, then 
this route should have been created years ago. Municipalities tend not to publish documents 
about the reasons for not doing something, so it will be much more challenging to find stated 
reasons from a municipality for not pursuing intermunicipal transit. That is why anecdotal 
evidence will be necessary to fill in the gaps where there is a lack of municipal surveys or 
interviews addressing this issue. Using these multiple data sources, a common narrative will 
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emerge about the contrast between BC Transit and Ontario’s transit and why Ontario has 
struggled to develop intermunicipal transit sustainably.  
The research can then be analyzed to see what general truths can be revealed about 
the state of intermunicipal transit in Ontario. The analysis will start with a high-level overview to 
see if transit moves in the right direction in both provinces. This could include looking at levels of 
cooperation in both provinces and seeing if intermunicipal routes are developed often. 
Secondly, both provinces will be analyzed to determine how adaptive they were to the 
cancellation of Greyhound Bus routes and the causes for any shortcomings. Thirdly, the 
anecdotal evidence will be vital for understanding why the province felt it was necessary to 
create micro-transit routes at the provincial level instead of working with existing transit 
authorities. Finally, after working through all of the research, this will lead to some conclusions 
about which types of municipalities have been the most affected by the lack of intermunicipal 
transit, what the most significant barrier is to development in Ontario, and provide clues about 
what Ontario can do from here to continue development. Ultimately, this research is designed to 
provide pragmatic suggestions about how Ontario could solve these problems to develop more 
intermunicipal transit options. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
In carrying out the research and analysis section of this paper, the approaches taken by 
British Columbia and Ontario will be compared to see which province is better positioned to 
create intermunicipal transit routes. Additionally, this in-depth study into Ontario’s intermunicipal 
transit structure aims to discern some general truths that could then be used for pragmatic 
advice for Ontario lawmakers. In making these determinations, this case study will compare the 
responses both provinces had to the route cancellations made by Greyhound Bus and Ontario 
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Northlander. The response was almost non-existent in Ontario until micro-transit routes were 
announced in 2018 while the response from BC Transit was immediate and robust. Secondly, 
there will be an analysis of the cooperation levels found in both provinces to see how well 
government agencies (municipalities, healthcare, province) have been able to cooperate. The 
ranges of cooperation could include sharing bus stops with an intermunicipal route and a 
financial partnership to accomplish a broader goal. Finally, this section will look at the London 
Transit Commission and why the province had to step in to create three microtransit routes 
specifically connecting London to the surrounding area. While London’s unwillingness to 
collaborate has been covered in the background section, this section will explore some of the 
nuances why the LTC made the decisions that they did. In the analysis section, the axioms and 
the rationale for them will be explained, including the types of municipalities that have been 
excluded from microtransit routes, and a conclusion from each section.  
 
4.1 Responses to Route Cancellations 
When intermunicipal transportation routes are cancelled, it can drastically limit the 
mobility of those who do not drive, and it should be the responsibility of governments to fill the 
gaps left in vital areas. The most notable case of intermunicipal transportation decline was in 
2018 when Greyhound Bus cancelled the majority of its routes in Ontario and Western Canada 
(Greyhound Bus, 2018). This decline left a substantial void in intermunicipal travel for those 
looking to travel throughout the province on a budget. Additionally, Ontario Northlander 
cancelled its Northern passenger train route in 2012 that went from Toronto to Cochrane 
(Horrobin, 2019). In response to the decline of intermunicipal transit options, BC Transit 
immediately began planning its response and launched BC Bus North, which filled the void left 
in the wake of Greyhound Bus (Nielsen, 2018). The bus service launched in less than a week 
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from when Greyhound stopped servicing those areas, and it now connects Fort Nelson, Prince 
George, Prince Rupert, and Valemount (BC Bus North, 2020). While most of British Columbia is 
connected through BC Transit or BC Bus North, there are still some parts of the province that 
remain unconnected. One notable missing route is the link between Kamloops and Valemount. 
This route would connect BC Bus North with the transit system in Kamloops. However, the 
Transportation Minister has said that it is too far for public transit to work (Davies, 2020). Plus, 
this route plus Vancouver to Kamloops and Vancouver to Kelowna is currently being served by 
Ebus, a private sector bus company (Ebus, 2020). In addition to all of the transportation 
networks mentioned thus far in British Columbia, BC Transit has also partnered with the Ministry 
of Health to ensure people who live in a community without a regional hospital can have 
equitable access to health care services. BC Transit Health Connections are primarily around 
the cities of Kamloops and Kelowna to connect the smaller municipalities to the regional health 
centres for appointments (BC Transit Health Connections, 2020). Finally, whenever a regional 
transit commission feels the need for a new transit route in their jurisdiction, it simply asks BC 
Transit to complete a feasibility study then BC Transit comes up with implementation options for 
the commission. There is no negotiation process necessary between municipalities or 
governmental entities; it is a streamlined process. This was exactly the case when the 
Alberni-Clayoquot Regional District asked BC Transit about the potential of starting a transit 
route between Tofino and Ucluelet (BC Transit - 4, 2020). BC Transit completed a feasibility 
study and was presenting options to the commission while attempting to seek public opinion 
before the pandemic. Ultimately, two years after Greyhound pulled out of the majority of British 
Columbia, the vast majority of the province remained accessible to those without a vehicle. 
Additionally, Greyhound cancelling the majority of their routes would not have even affected 
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passengers because BC Transit was quick to set up an alternative transit option that would be 
subsidized and cheaper than the private sector option.  
Ontario also took immediate action to fill in the gaps left by the route cancellations from 
Greyhound Bus. However, it took a lot longer to roll out their program. After Greyhound pulled 
the majority of their bus routes from Ontario, the Ministry of Transportation launched an initiative 
to pay for microtransit routes for the first five years. It required municipalities without transit to 
apply and to indicate which municipalities would be connected on each route. Of course, this 
approach requires the approval and support of each municipality involved. Once applications 
and funding were approved, routes were going to start-up in the Spring of 2020, however, this 
has since been pushed back due to COVID-19 (Strathroy-Caradoc, 2020). Additionally, Ontario 
Northland (a provincial crown corporation) was also able to extend its bus transit routes in 
Northern Ontario to Thunder Bay after Greyhound’s departure. This expansion took some time 
to get underway, and it might have been because while Ontario Northland and BC Transit are 
similar in their authority over their respective areas, BC Transit has the power of taxation (BC 
Transit Act, s.16) where Ontario Northland does not, and requires government funding to 
survive (ONTC, 2018, p.31). Therefore, it only makes sense that it took longer for Ontario 
Northland to respond than BC Transit as BC Transit could just plan to raise revenues in the 
following years to pay for any debt incurred. While Ontario’s transportation expansion took time 
to be funded and finally launched in the Spring of 2020 (Coffin, 2020). It seems clear that 
Ontario Northland filled most of the void left by Greyhound and that the microtransit routes being 
developed are primarily an extension of current transit services. If the microtransit routes were 
not created to fill the Greyhound Bus gaps, then it raises questions as to why microtransit routes 
were not in place before. This is especially perplexing for the smaller routes like the Dorchester 
to London route or the Strathroy to London route as Greyhound serviced neither or these 
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routes. In answering this, a large part of it comes down to the levels of cooperation each 
province is used to seeing and how easy it is to obtain cooperation from different governmental 
entities.  
 
4.2 The Range of Cooperation 
In both British Columbia and Ontario, different governmental entities are required to work 
together to provide a comprehensive intermunicipal transit network. Some of these entities 
refuse to cooperate in any meaningful way with other entities, while others are closer to full 
integration. As this section works through the available cases, it will be clear how the 
governmental entities in British Columbia, on average, have much higher levels of cooperation 
than the governmental entities in Ontario. The cooperation levels used for this section will be 
non-existent, some cooperation, and a high level of cooperation. The non-existent designation is 
for transit authorities that do not work with any other transit authority even if an intermunicipal 
route could be possible from their municipality. Some cooperation is reserved for those 
municipalities willing to assist other municipalities but are not willing to engage in any 
meaningful cooperation or designate any financial assistance to reach common goals. Finally, 
high levels of cooperation are reserved for the entities that go out of their way to reach common 
goals. This designation could include communities committing financial resources or extending 
services across municipal boundaries. As Ontario has so many municipal transit authorities, 
there will be more cases with a wider range of results in Ontario, but there will only be a few 
examples from Ontario in each category. 
Starting with the highest levels of cooperation, it is clear that very few transit 
organizations are capable of cooperating to such a high degree. BC Transit utilizes its provincial 
authority over municipalities to ensure cooperation, it also works with other governmental 
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entities like BC Health to provide transit services for patients. Providing these services becomes 
especially important when there is only one regional hospital and no way for some patients to 
get there. That is why the two organizations partnered together to create BC Health Transit 
Connections. BC Transit works with regional health authorities to negotiate routes and payment 
for this service (Interior Health, 2009, p.7). It would also be fair to say that BC Transit also 
maintains a high level of cooperation with the regional commissions that they work with to plan 
and determine transit routes for municipalities. Even if this cooperation is mandated through 
provincial legislation. Additionally, Translink and GO Transit share a similar authority over their 
jurisdictions. The two city centres of Toronto and Vancouver offer the most connected service 
that crosses several municipal boundaries, and often municipalities are eager to work with them 
to get access to GO Transit. For example, Niagara Region heard that GO Transit was looking at 
extending a light rail line out to their region in 2016, so they spearheaded a project to create 
intermunicipal transit within their region. They did this for two reasons, first to convince GO 
Transit and the provincial government that Niagara was willing to do what it takes to help the rail 
line succeed. Secondly, a robust transit system would help move passengers around their 
region and creates opportunities for tourism and economic development (Welland, 2016). Giving 
the Greater GTA easy access to one of Ontario’s biggest tourist destinations was very exciting 
and beneficial to the Niagara Region. However, the fact that Niagara Region was able to turn 
this opportunity into one that helps connect the whole area to the GO Transit stop shows how 
willing they are to cooperate. Additionally, Durham Region Transit is also a good example 
because they have a regional transit system that connects multiple lower-tier municipalities to 
GO Transit stops (DRT - 1, 2020). To make things easier for riders, they recently switched to 
using the same payment system as GO Transit, the Presto payment card (DRT - 2, 2020). 
Ultimately, it seems that the organizations with provincial authority seem to be best positioned to 
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be able to foster high levels of cooperation, however, smaller authorities can still do a lot to help 
foster cooperation.  
In looking at the systems with some degree of cooperation, we are likely to find a wide 
range of integration and the largest number of transit systems. Almost every municipality 
connected to a regional transit system could be said to have some degree of cooperation simply 
because they allowed that service to come into their municipality (unless they actively protested 
it). Additionally, the same logic applies to any lower tier that allows transit that is operated by an 
upper-tier government. However, this section will specifically talk about some unique cases in 
Ontario that warrant a closer look. For instance, Barrie Transit might be a good candidate for a 
transit system with high levels of cooperation. They have GO Transit stops, their own transit 
system, and they allow Simcoe County to use their transit stops too. However, they do not pay 
any money to help Simcoe County, and they do not seem to have any desire to connect with 
Innisfil either. This situation again raises questions about who should pay for transit services. 
Should the larger urban centre help subsidize a transit route to connect to smaller cities? It 
seems like large urban centres should bear at least some responsibility as they are the ones 
gaining economic activity from it. However, perhaps the bulk of the responsibility should remain 
on smaller municipalities because it is their residents that are gaining the benefit of transit. 
Other examples of cooperation include intermunicipal transit services between lower-tier 
municipalities with the same upper-tier government or crossing into one separate municipality. 
This type of cooperation would include Simcoe County, which connects several lower-tier 
municipalities with Barrie and its transit network (County of Simcoe - 2, 2020). Durham region 
has also taken the same approach (DRT - 1, 2020) along with Windsor’s transit being extended 
into Essex County. In the case of Windsor-Leamington, Windsor is essentially acting as a 
service delivery contractor for Leamington, and in return, Leamington is contributing financially 
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for the operation of these specific transit routes (Pinto, 2019). Finally, the lowest end of this 
cooperation category is the microtransit routes that the province has started up. Between British 
Columbia and Ontario, there is an apparent trend that the cost of transit services is shared 
between the province and the local municipality. The two exceptions that have been 
encountered include, first, the case of BC Transit sharing the cost of BC Health Connections 
with regional health authorities instead of municipalities. The second case is GO Transit since it 
does not have the power of taxation like Translink, but relies on provincial contributions. These 
are two notable exceptions due to the important role they play in each province, however, it 
remains to be seen if microtransit will play as important of a role in the future. In theory, 
microtransit should also be a shared cost service that municipalities contribute to, however, 
there has been no easy way to convince municipalities to get on board with this idea without 
forcing them. Plus, even if the province were able to convince some municipalities to contribute, 
there would likely be other municipalities on the same route that would refuse to contribute. 
Hence, the province has opted not to supersede local autonomy and pay for it themselves. The 
cooperation level is so low in the case of microtransit because the province simply asked 
municipalities to apply if they wanted microtransit services, and then the province gave them the 
money to make it happen. The most cooperation that took place came from the City of London, 
where they helped the surrounding municipalities plan their microtransit routes because they 
have experience in planning routes. However, none of these municipalities had to make a 
meaningful sacrifice to make this pilot project happen.  
This final section will look at the lowest level of cooperation, where no transit cooperation 
has taken place at any level. Some of these municipalities do not have any transit services, 
while some might only have an intramunicipal service. However, in all of these cases, there is at 
least the potential for intermunicipal services to be developed. As Ontario currently utilizes an 
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approach where municipalities are required to apply for funding and wait to see if they get it, 
there are several reasons why money may not always end up where it should. For starters, a 
municipality may not see the announcement, and they might forget about the deadline or think 
they are not qualified. Additionally, the province might misunderstand the application or think 
that other municipalities are better suited for the money. Finally, provincial politicians might 
prefer money to be spent on their constituents to help their reelection. For all these reasons, 
Ontario’s system can and has failed several municipalities in relation to their intermunicipal 
transit development. As many microtransit routes were set up to help municipalities with more 
than 10,000 people and were within a forty-minute drive of an urban centre, this was used as a 
starting point for finding possible underserved municipalities. This threshold is further confirmed 
as a limit to intermunicipal transit as Orangeville has been able to hold onto their GO Transit bus 
service even while Bolton, Cambridge, and Milton have all seen a permanent reduction in 
services (Halliday, 2019). Orangeville has a population just under 29,000 and is about half an 
hour driving away from Brampton (Google Maps, 2020). With all that being said, the 
municipalities that could sustain being connected to GO Transit through intermunicipal transit 
include Bracebridge, Gravenhurst, Huntsville, Lindsay, and Woodstock. Huntsville does break 
the initial requirements of being within a forty-minute drive. However, a route could be 
established to connect Huntsville, Bracebridge, and Gravenhurst to the Orillia Go Bus Transit 
station. This route would provide an intermunicipal transit service for the 48,000+ people living 
in these three communities. Admittedly, only connecting to a GO Transit stop just means that 
commuters will likely have to travel further to get to where they want to go. This means that 
these routes are less likely to succeed over time. The second group is far more likely to succeed 
as it identifies some municipalities within the criteria that could be connected to an urban centre 
with a population of over 50,000 people. This could include connecting Amherstburg, Cobourg, 
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Napanee, Port Hope, and Sturgeon Falls with their neighbouring urban centre. Connecting small 
municipalities with urban centres with regular intermunicipal routes is vital if commuters are 
going to rely on the service for school, regular medical appointments, or recreational activities. 
One possible route for these purposes could include connecting Cobourg and Port Hope with 
Oshawa. This route would provide over 35,000 people with regular access to a large urban 
centre with amenities and services for them to use. Additionally, Napanee could be connected 
with Kingston, Sturgeon Falls with North Bay, and Amherstburg with Windsor. Based on the 
routes currently being developed for microtransit, these would all be viable routes that could be 
sustained over the long term, but as none of them were awarded funding, they were unable to 
collaborate to build their transportation network. This is by no means intended to be an 
exhaustive list of all possible municipalities missing out on intermunicipal transit, but it does list 
several examples where this ‘apply for funding’ approach has failed. 
Comparing two systems with vastly different corporate structures highlights the levels of 
cooperation that can be attained with a centripetal authority model. British Columbia only has 
two transit authorities to judge which have both attained high levels of saturation in terms of 
building intermunicipal transit networks. Alternatively, Ontario has over 100 transit authorities 
that range in jurisdiction and levels of cooperation. Some of these transit authorities have done 
well in Ontario by partnering with other municipalities and working towards system integration, 
while others have struggled to gain any traction. The province has stepped in with microtransit 
routes to connect municipalities with urban centres, but the provincial approach of making 
municipalities apply for this funding has left multiple municipalities behind. These municipalities 
appear to be good candidates for intermunicipal transit based on current transit systems, but 
they have failed to get funding for unknown reasons. Despite any desire the province might 




4.3 London Transit Commission 
The London Transit Commission (LTC) was explicitly left out of the last section because they 
offer a unique case in Ontario when it comes to cooperation with other municipalities. While the 
LTC was willing to help smaller municipalities out when they were trying to figure out their routes 
for microtransit, they are unwilling to extend transit services outside of their municipality or 
spend any tax dollars to create intermunicipal transit. As mentioned earlier, London, Ontario, 
has a bylaw that prevents the LTC from operating outside the municipal boundary (London 
By-law A.-6377-206, 2016). Their refusal to cooperate with other municipalities is precisely why 
the province had to step in and create microtransit routes around London. Dorchester is just 
outside of London and is essentially a suburb of the city. It is only a nine-minute drive to 
London’s border and less than 19 minutes to get to Fanshawe College (a significant destination 
and connection point for transit routes). Not only would creating a route like this be beneficial for 
the college, but it would also help drive economic dollars into the rest of the city. Plus, refusing 
to cooperate and develop any intermunicipal transit routes just punishes those who cannot drive 
themselves. This neglect leads to a ceiling on access to services based on how willing and able 
their friends and family are to drive them to appointments. The fact that London has not been 
connected to any other municipality for so long when there are a number of options close by 
seems like a huge missed opportunity. It is kind of depressing that London was utterly unwilling 
to negotiate or discuss the potentiality of developing intermunicipal transit services.  
In defence of the LTC, even if they were allowed to develop transit outside their 
jurisdiction, it would not be an easy task. Several questions would arise about who should pay 
for what. For instance, should operating costs be split between the rural municipality with the 
urban centre? The urban centre obtains an advantage in economic activity, however, social 
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services might see an increase in activity (and costs) due to ease of access for the surrounding 
population. If the urban centre is expected to contribute, then what will the split be based on? If 
it is based on property values, then is it fair that urban residents should be paying a higher 
percentage per capita because urban homes often have higher valuations? If it is based on an 
equal cost per person, it could place a much more significant burden on the smaller 
municipalities budget where property taxes are already higher than urban centres. None of this 
is apparent for either side, and both municipalities will argue to pay a lower price, and 
negotiations could quickly fail, and nothing will happen. Besides, it is not like other large 
municipalities outside the GTA go out of their way to develop intermunicipal transit. When GO 
Transit asks to come to a municipality, they do so without raising municipal taxes because the 
province funds it. Alternatively, when smaller municipalities want to get connected to an urban 
centre, the smaller municipality often pays for all of the operating costs. Barrie, Ontario, 
demonstrates this example perfectly. They did not pay to have GO Transit connect them or to 
have Simcoe County run their bus lines to their stations, but they allowed it, and now their 
residents have increased mobility without paying for the operational costs. Ultimately, the entire 
corporate structure that the province has established for creating intermunicipal transit outside 
the GTA is flawed. This corporate structure will cause some areas to be utterly void of 
cooperation, while other areas of the province will be able to develop sustainable routes that 
provide substantial benefits to residents. 
 
4.4 Analysis 
Throughout the comparative case study between British Columbia’s transit systems and 
Ontario’s, several key takeaways can be learned. First, BC Transit was far quicker to respond to 
the Greyhound route cancellations. This much is clear, however, what is less clear is why 
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Ontario was so much slower to respond. I propose that Ontario was slower due to their 
corporate structures. Secondly, Ontario’s transit authorities have a wide range of experience in 
cooperating with other municipalities. In British Columbia, cooperation is all at high levels, while 
it ranges from non-existence to high levels in Ontario. Two things can be learned here - the 
centrifugal authority structure disproportionately benefits larger municipalities, and the 
municipalities most often excluded are those with 10,000 - 40,000 residents that are less than 
forty minutes driving from an urban centre. Thirdly, with the LTC’s refusal to cooperate with 
other municipalities, they make the case clear that there are many hurdles in intermunicipal 
transit and that if the province wants these routes to happen organically, then corporate 
structures need to change. These conclusions will be pivotal for providing policy 
recommendations in the next section.  
Firstly, it was noted how much quicker British Columbia was able to respond to the 
cancellation of Greyhound routes than Ontario transit systems. While BC Transit was able to 
launch BC Bus North in the days after the routes stopped running, it took Ontario a year and a 
half to have their routes launch. It seems like the primary response from Ontario was to simply 
expand the services of Ontario Northland and then to launch microtransit routes. The 
microtransit routes were supposed to launch in the Spring of 2020 but were delayed due to the 
global pandemic. The question that remains to be answered is to ask why Ontario was so much 
slower than BC Transit in making up this deficit in intermunicipal transit. The answer is twofold. 
The first reason relates to the level of control transit authorities have in each province, and the 
second reason relates to jurisdictional boundaries. The level of control transit authorities have in 
each province is vastly different and allows them to respond at very different paces when 
unexpected situations arise. In British Columbia, BC Transit is a crown corporation that has the 
power of taxation. Additionally, they are also the authority for transit operations for the entire 
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province except in the Vancouver area. This authority means that when an unexpected situation 
arises, they can raise taxes, create new routes, or establish a sub-entity like BC Bus North. In 
contrast to the BC model, Ontario transit authorities largely fall under the authority of 
municipalities, which are heavily influenced by the funding model and policies set by the 
provincial government. Additionally, when a transit authority wants to add busses, they often 
need to apply to the province to be awarded grants to afford the expansion. Plus, the jurisdiction 
of the transit authorities might only include one municipality and would force them to cooperate 
with another transit authority if they ever wanted to offer intermunicipal services. These systemic 
barriers are why the province needed to step in to pay for the expansion of Ontario Northland 
services and the establishment of microtransit routes. All transit authorities heavily rely on 
provincial funding, and they have no other way to raise the funding necessary to expand 
services. This Ontario model of transit authorities being subjected to the whims of local and 
provincial politicians places many barriers in their way to developing a robust transit system. 
Ideally, transit authorities in Ontario would be given the same level of control that is experienced 
in BC by allowing them to simply create and sustain transit routes that make sense for the 
province. It would also be ideal if their jurisdictional areas could be expanded to include more 
municipalities, especially in Southwestern Ontario. Even if just the jurisdictional area of transit 
authorities was increased to accommodate commuter sheds. This approach would help the LTC 
and its lack of cooperation by forcing it to work with Middlesex County. This kind of 
amalgamation would also help minimize municipal politicians’ influence since a regional transit 
authority would not be under the purview of one municipality’s bylaws. 
Secondly, the levels of cooperation are higher with British Columbia’s transit authorities 
than Ontario’s and it helps contribute to systemic inequality between different sized 
municipalities. Large urban centres are often the most connected because they have the 
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services that people want to access, while smaller municipalities are left unconnected. When 
municipalities are left on their own to negotiate with one another, large urban centres seem to 
avoid helping smaller communities financially. The smaller municipalities will have to pay their 
own way (with provincial assistance) because there is no political pressure within cities to 
connect smaller municipalities with an urban centre. Plus, smaller municipalities gain a lot in 
terms of access to services and amenities by getting connected to the urban centre. The range 
in cooperation can also partially be explained by the corporate structure and the restrictive 
jurisdictional areas of transit authorities. It is also worth noting that the smaller municipalities that 
could have the potential to sustain intermunicipal transit but have been excluded thus far share 
similar features. They include municipalities with 10,000 to 40,000 residents, and they are also 
within a forty-minute drive from the nearest urban centre. This includes the municipalities of 
Amherstburg, Cobourg, Napanee, Port Hope, and Sturgeon Falls. These municipalities have 
been excluded from cooperation even though they have the potential to sustain microtransit 
routes to their respective urban centre. It might have been the case that these municipalities 
simply did not apply for the funding to receive a microtransit route. They could have been too 
busy or not think that they required it, or felt like it was unsustainable and were worried about 
who would pay for these services after five years. Whatever the case, it is clear that making 
municipalities apply for funding is not the best way to ensure there is an equitable distribution of 
provincial funds. Especially when there is uncertainty about who is going to pay for services 
after the pilot project is over.  
Thirdly, the London Transit Commission (LTC) presents a clear case for why the 
corporate structure should change in Ontario. Extending intermunicipal transit services outside 
of London is geographically difficult because London is not close enough to any other major 
urban centre to justify intermunicipal transit for their own sake. Ideally, if London was closer to 
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Toronto or another city that was of similar size or larger, then there might be a rationale for the 
LTC to justify the expense for the sake of their own residents. However, it is harder for the LTC 
to see the benefit in creating intermunicipal transit for municipalities that are smaller than 
London. Additionally, negotiating with other municipalities to determine who should pay for 
operating expenses has been a difficult area to navigate. While it is a little unfair to place blame 
on the LTC for not establishing intermunicipal transit routes that extend into Middlesex County, it 
is blameworthy not to try. By not even attempting to negotiate, the LTC has systematically 
restricted or even denied services to those who need it in the surrounding areas. It is for these 
reasons that many organizations, including the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC), 
have begun to see public transit as a human right and not just as a nice to have public service 
(OHRC, 2020). While this article focuses on the requirement for equal access to transit for those 
who are disabled, it would not be impossible to imagine a human right of this sort being 
extended to this situation. With the LTC refusing to cooperate or negotiate in good faith to 
create intermunicipal transit, they systematically deny human rights. Additionally, when 
conducting a route structure and service guideline review in 2015, they even note how the 
provinces’ policy objectives include the development of routes across jurisdictional boundaries 
(LTC - 3, 2015, p.3 s.1.6.7.3). However, throughout the rest of the document, there is not 
another mention or consideration of intermunicipal transit, and this document served as the 
LTC’s five-year plan for route development (LTC - 3, 2015, p. i). Clearly, the LTC had no desire 
to try and change the bylaw that is preventing them from developing intermunicipal transit 
routes. Luckily, the province has stepped in to create microtransit routes for the LTC, which 
would likely alleviate any responsibility they might have had to create intermunicipal routes 
where it might have been sustainable. Plus, it is just bad policymaking to categorically deny this 
kind of transit development as an increase in traffic could be justified based on the economic 
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impact that they have on the city. Especially when they are not even driving vehicles to congest 
traffic any further than one bus might do. Regardless of how much blame should be placed on 
the LTC and London City Council, it is clear that the current system requires a change in order 
for it to work for all transit authorities. Some options could include divorcing transit authorities 
from municipalities or creating regional transit authorities to control commuter sheds into urban 
centres. Options to promote intermunicipal transit could range from minor adjustments or an 
entire system overhaul, depending on what the provincial government and culture of the 
province would be willing to support.  
In concluding this section, it is important to note how the current system does not 
adequately set up Ontario for long term success in creating intermunicipal transit. Based on how 
every transit system is currently set up in British Columbia and Ontario, there is a unifying theme 
that it is best to split the transit operating costs between the province and municipalities. This 
funding arrangement is in place for all the transit systems in British Columbia and almost all of 
the transit systems in Ontario. The only exceptions are the Ontario Northlander bus service, a 
long haul bus service and not transit, and GO Transit. Ideally, if Ontario continues to pay for the 
successful microtransit routes long term as it does for GO Transit, then there should not be a 
problem. However, with changing governments, the microtransit routes could be cancelled at a 
moment’s notice or simply not renewed with a new government. If the service was shared with 
municipalities, it would be more likely not to be cut as it would cost the provincial government 







CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Policy Recommendations 
It is clear that in order for more intermunicipal transit routes to be developed, the current 
system should be changed to remove barriers. The changes being recommended here range 
from small to substantial systemic changes, however, the ultimate goal is to encourage the 
provincial government to remove barriers to allow more intermunicipal routes to be developed - 
regardless of the approach. Recommendations include not changing anything from a corporate 
level, but increasing funding to develop more intermunicipal routes. A small change could 
broaden the jurisdictions of transit authorities or remove the requirement of municipalities to 
apply for funding but offer money based on expert opinions. Some medium changes could 
include creating a separate transit authority for intermunicipal transit or merging the service with 
GO Transit to allow for a more cohesive system (payment, schedules, funding model, etc.). 
Another mild change could include giving the power of taxation to transit authorities and electing 
board members like school board trustees. If the government of the day was feeling particularly 
bold, it could pursue a more drastic option and delegate all transit authority to one or two 
provincial bodies to model BC’s approach to transit. This approach could include keeping GO 
Transit and creating one other transit authority to operate or contract out all other transit 
operations in the province. Transition to one or two transit authorities would require so much 
systemic change that it would be unlikely to go over well with politicians, unions, or the general 
public for the sole fact that it would change so much overnight. This paper is listing several 
options because there are so many options available for the province to consider that it would 
be silly only to propose one option as a viable solution. Again the goal is to remove barriers to 
intermunicipal transit development by any means necessary, and it was not within the scope of 
this paper to determine which approach would be best. It is likely that the most significant barrier 
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to implementation of any of these policy suggestions would be acceptance from municipal 
politicians and the public service unions. That is why it is also likely that several of these options 
would be acceptable and that it would be the job of the politician to make the decision for which 
direction the province should head in.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, there has been an unequivocal call for reform in the management 
of transit services in Ontario. The benefits of transit have been well documented and provide a 
framework for insisting on the need for intermunicipal transit. Not only does intermunicipal transit 
provide an opportunity to lower greenhouse gas emissions, but it also provides access to 
socioeconomic opportunities, government services, and increases one’s quality of life. Ontario’s 
model for managing intermunicipal transit does not seem bad at first blush, but when it is 
compared to British Columbia, the problems quickly become apparent. British Columbia uses a 
centripetal governance model where only two provincial organizations hold all the authority over 
transit decisions. Holding this authority allows them to respond quickly to unexpected events like 
Greyhound reducing bus services and cooperating with other government organizations with 
ease. In Ontario, some of the problems that become apparent are the lack of adaptiveness to 
the Greyhound route cancellations and degrees of cooperation between transit authorities. 
Some transit authorities in Ontario go out of their way to cooperate and help reach provincial 
goals, while others are entirely left out. Even the methods for assigning transit grants are done 
in unequal terms by requiring municipalities to apply for funding and hope the province supports 
their planned development. All of the problems present in Ontario stem from corporate 
structures in how transit authorities do not have the power of taxation and are based around a 
centrifugal model of governance where authority is dispersed away from a centralized 
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government. This approach makes it extremely difficult for transit authorities to negotiate and 
pursue a fair deal when developing intermunicipal transit, resulting in intermunicipal transit not 
being developed at all. The most notable progress made in intermunicipal transit made recently 
has been the development of microtransit routes by the province. While this initiative helped 
connect several municipalities, it still excludes other municipalities who share similar features. 
Microtransit routes also seem to be an early indication that the province is giving up on having 
transit authorities work together and will instead develop intermunicipal transit themselves. 
Currently, the entire model of governance in Ontario appears unsustainable. First, there is no 
corporate structure of governance overseeing the development or operations of the microtransit 
routes. Second, municipalities/homeowners do not directly pay for services resulting in an 
inequality of distribution for provincial funds. Additionally, will the province start paying for the 
transit routes that already exist between municipalities? Taking on these costs would be another 
huge expense for the province since cost-sharing between the province and municipalities has 
been a well-established norm. Finally, as municipalities grow, there is no requirement or 
transition plan to allow for two transit systems to integrate well even if they do not merge. 
Ultimately, this leads to the strong suggestion that Ontario should change how transit is 
managed within Ontario to allow for better integration and development of intermunicipal transit 
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